





1.		Pluralism	about	Objective	Probability			 Rudolf	Carnap	(1945,	1950)	was	one	of	the	first	analytical	philosophers	of	science	to	openly	defend	and	promote	the	view	that	there	is	not	just	one	kind	of	probability	but	a	variety	of	kinds;	and	correspondingly	not	just	one	“probability”	concept,	but	a	plurality	of	concepts.		Carnap’s	pluralism	was	modest:	having	rejected	one	concept,	he	settled	for	the	next	number	up,	namely	two	concepts,	so	minimizing	the	variety	as	much	as	possible.	He	characteristically	referred	to	these	two	concepts	by	means	of	indexes,	as	probability1	and	probability2.	Probability1	is	applicable	to	the	confirmation	of	theories	by	empirical	evidence,	and	more	particularly	to	the	confirmation	of	theoretical	sentences	by	so-called	protocol	sentences.	Thus	we	say	that	a	particular	theory	is	more	or	less	probable	in	the	light	of	evidence;	and	that	it	is	more	or	less	probable	than	some	competitor	in	the	light	of	such	evidence;	and	we	may	even	have	reason	to	assert	that	its	degree	of	confirmation,	or	probability,	is	0.9	or	some	other	such	value	in	the	real	unit	interval.	The	first	type	of	probability	is	thus	not	a	mind	or	language	independent	feature	of	the	world.	It	is	rather	a	feature	or	our	theories	or	linguistic	descriptions	of	the	world.	In	other	words	the	term	“probability1”	belongs	in	what	Carnap	called	the	formal	mode	of	speech	(Carnap,	1935/37).				 The	second	kind	of	probability,	or	“Probability2”,	is	by	contrast	a	mind	or	language	independent	objective	feature	of	the	world.	It	depends	on	the	way	the	world	is	constituted	and	what	the	facts	are,	regardless	of	our	language,	cognitive	or	mental	states,	beliefs,	attitudes	or	abilities.	In	other	words,	“probability2”	is	a	term	that	belongs	in	the	material	mode	of	speech,	and	appears	in	ordinary	descriptions	of	the	objective	probabilities	or	chances	of	particular	events.	Science	merely	extends	this	ordinary	use	of	language	in	order	to	describe	particular	phenomena	as	stochastic	by	means	of	statistical	or	probabilistic	models.	The	statements	regarding	“probabilities”	that	appear	in	scientific	models	–	in	physics	and	elsewhere	–	are	therefore	all	prima	facie	“probability2”	statements.			 Carnap	went	on	to	associate	these	statements	to	statistical	frequencies	in	the	empiricist	tradition	of	Von	Mises	(1928)	or	Reichenbach	(1935).	We	nowadays	
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think	that	no	mere	statistical	interpretation	of,	say,	the	quantum	state	vector,	or	the	probabilities	that	it	entails,	can	be	made	to	work.	However,	for	Carnap	the	fortune	of	a	frequency	interpretation	of	objective	probability	is	a	matter	of	secondary	importance	–	and	he	was	in	fact	acutely	critical	of	some	key	aspects	in	Reichenbach’s	empiricist	account.	Carnap’s	main	concern	was	not	to	defend	frequencies,	but	genuine	objective	probabilities.	And	while	his	particular	contrast	between	logical	and	frequency	concepts	of	probability	did	not	perhaps	succeed	well,	the	overall	two-fold	pluralism	did.	Thus	twenty	years	on,	we	find	Ian	Hacking	(1975)	drawing	a	similar	two-fold	distinction	between	subjective	and	objective	aspects	of	probability.		More	recent	work	in	the	philosophy	of	probability	(e.g.	Gillies,	2000)	if	anything	entrenches	this	kind	of	pluralism,	as	a	positive	state	of	things	to	be	celebrated.				2.		Reductive	Analyses	of	Chance			 The	philosophy	of	objective	chance	has	throughout	much	of	its	history	pursued	a	reductionist	agenda.	Some	philosophers	have	attempted	to	reduce	objective	probabilities	or	chances	to	frequencies	or	ratios	in	(virtual	or	real)	sequences	of	experimental	outcomes;	others	have	attempted	to	reduce	them	to	propensities,	understood	as	the	probabilistic	dispositions	of	chancy	set	ups	or	arrangements.	2	Such	reductive	exercises	are	at	least	prima	facie	contrary	to	appearances.	Consider	a	few	statements	of	paradigmatic	objective	chances	as	expressed	in	the	material	mode	of	speech:		 1) A	coin’s	propensity	to	land	heads	with	a	certain	probability	when	tossed	as	displayed	in	a	long	sequence	of	tosses.		 2) Smoking’s	propensity	to	cause	lung	cancer	with	a	certain	probability,	as	demonstrated	by	control	population	statistics.																																																										2	Lewisian	analyses	of	chance	in	the	spirit	of	Hume	may	be	regarded	as	a	variety	of	frequency	accounts	for	the	purposes	of	this	paper.	
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the	failures	of	reductive	programmes	(section	3).	The	positive	reasons	are	connected	with	the	presuppositions	of	scientific	practice	(section	4)			3.	Against	the	Identity	Thesis			 Let	me	briefly	review	the	argument	from	the	philosophy	of	probability	against	the	identity	thesis	between	propensities	and	probabilities.5	The	identity	thesis	has	two	parts,	or	halves,	which	we	may	refer	to	as	the	propensity-to-probability	half	and	the	probability-to-propensity	half.	The	former	asserts	that	all	propensities	are,	or	can	be	represented	as,	probabilities.	The	latter	states	that	all	probabilities	are	propensities,	or	can	be	interpreted	as	such.	Together	they	make	the	full	claim	that	probabilities	and	propensities	are	extensionally	identical.				 Both	parts	of	the	identity	thesis	are	in	fact	false,	as	is	shown	by	different	forms	of	what	is	known	as	Humphreys’	paradox.	The	falsity	of	the	probability-to-propensity	half	is	a	trivial	consequence	of	the	asymmetries	of	propensities.	This	is	best	understood	by	considering	a	causal	propensity	such	as	smoking’s	propensity	to	cause	lung	cancer	(my	example	2	above).	Suppose	we	estimate	for	a	particular	population	the	incidence	of	lung	cancer	amongst	smokers	at	1%,	which	we	may	write	as	P	(C	/S)=	0.01.	And	suppose	that	we	also	have	estimates	for	the	prior	probabilities	of	smoking	and	lung	cancer	across	the	population	at,	say,	20%	and	0,5%	respectively	(P	(S)=	0.2	and	P	(C)	=	0.005).	We	may	then	easily	estimate	the	inverse	probability	by	means	of	Bayes’	theorem:			 	 .			 Now,	the	first	half	of	the	identity	thesis	(the	probability-to-propensity	half)	holds	that	probabilities	may	be	interpreted	as	propensities.	If	so,	P	(C/S)	may	be	understood	as	the	propensity	of	smoking	to	cause	cancer.	But	it	follows	from	our																																																									5	The	full	argument	may	be	found	in	Suárez	(2013,	2014)	of	which	this	section	is	an	elaboration	and	summary.	
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derivation	that	P	(S/C)	is	then	also	well-defined	at	40%,	so	it	must	also	receive	a	propensity	interpretation,	which	seems	just	impossible:	There	is	simply	no	propensity	of	lung	cancer	to	cause	smoking.				 While	this	simple	type	of	argument	is	well	known	the	consequences	for	the	identity	thesis	are	not	always	fully	appreciated.	Propensities	are	asymmetric	in	a	way	that	probabilities	are	not.	The	asymmetry	is	revealed	most	strikingly	in	the	case	of	causal	propensities,	but	is	more	generally	a	feature	of	all	propensities	whether	or	not	causal.	Thus	a	coin’s	propensity	to	land	heads,	and	a	radioactive	atom’s	propensity	to	decay	are	also	asymmetric	in	a	way	that	generates	a	similar	problem	for	their	Bayes	inverse	probabilities.	We	may	hope	that	the	other	half	of	the	identity	thesis	(the	propensity-to-probability	half)	holds	nonetheless,	and	that	it	is	still	the	case	that	all	propensities	are	probabilities.	While	this	half	on	its	own	fails	short	of	a	full	reductive	analysis	for	probabilities,	it	is	still	an	account	of	propensities	as	probabilities.				 However,	Paul	Humphreys’	original	argument	defeats	this	half	of	the	identity	thesis	as	well.	Humphreys	(1985)	considered	a	thought	experiment	where,	regardless	of	the	outcome,	the	propensities	of	the	system	described	are	not	and	cannot	be	represented	as	probabilities.	He	considered	a	source	emitting	one	photon	at	a	time	t1,	reaching	a	half	silver	mirror	at	time	t2,	and	being	transmitted	at	time	t3.	He	then	plausibly	stipulated	that	the	following	three	claims	hold	regarding	the	propensities	of	the	photon	in	the	thought	experiment:		 i) Any	photon	that	reaches	the	half	silver	mirror	has	some	finite	(non-zero)	propensity	to	be	transmitted.	ii) Any	photon	that	is	emitted	has	some	propensity	greater	than	zero	but	not	one	to	reach	the	mirror.	iii) Any	photon	that	is	emitted	and	fails	to	reach	the	mirror	has	propensity	zero	(i.e.	it	has	no	propensity)	to	be	transmitted.				 These	claims	may	all	be	regarded	as	uncontroversial	regarding	the	thought	experiment	at	hand.	They	all	certainly	seem	very	plausible.	Humphreys	rendered	
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these	claims	in	a	conditional	probability	formulation	that	is	however	far	from	innocuous	or	obvious,	as	follows:		i)	 .	ii)	 .	iii)	 .			 Each	of	these	formal	conditions	is	meant	to	capture	fully	each	of	the	corresponding	physical	claims	regarding	the	propensities	at	work	in	the	thought	experiment.	This	assumes	that	there	is	always	a	unique	representation	for	propensities	in	terms	of	conditional	probabilities.	Yet,	these	three	formal	conditions	are	inconsistent	with	the	Kolmogorov	axioms,	and	in	particular	with	the	fourth	axiom	for	conditional	probability	(also	known	as	the	ratio	analysis	of	conditional	probability).			 Now,	there	are	a	number	of	caveats	to	Humphreys’	proof,	which	I	cannot	discuss	here	in	full,	but	deserve	a	brief	mention.		Firstly,	the	proof	assumes	a	principle	of	conditional	independence	whereby	propensities	do	not	act	backwards	in	time:	 .	The	principle	is	indeed	questionable	in	general,	since	there	is	no	reason	why	propensities	should	be	any	more	forward-looking	than	causes.	In	other	words,	the	asymmetry	of	propensities	is	not	the	asymmetry	of	time,	but	is	rather	a	sui	generis	asymmetry,	which	may	or	not	coincide	with	temporal	asymmetry.	Yet,	in	the	thought	experiment	at	hand,	the	application	of	conditional	independence	is	legitimate	–	in	other	words	the	propensities	that	obtain	in	the	thought	experiment	are	all	as	a	matter	of	fact	forward	looking.	So	the	proof	does	not	hang	on	this	assumption	being	generally	valid.			 The	second	caveat	is	that	relinquishing	the	ratio	analysis	of	conditional	probability	(i.e.	giving	up	on	the	Kolmogorov	calculus,	or	at	least	on	the	implicated	fourth	axiom:	 ),	does	not	actually	deliver	us	from	contradiction,	
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		 1. Conclusion			 I	have	argued	for	maximal	pluralism	about	chance,	by	providing	negative	and	positive	arguments	for	a	tripartite	distinction	between	propensities,	probabilities,	and	frequencies.	Humphreys’	paradox	provides	grounds	for	the	distinction,	since	it	makes	it	very	implausible	that	chances	may	be	reduced	or	analysed	away	in	any	fewer	terms.	In	addition,	I	have	positively	displayed	elements	in	the	practice	of	statistical	modelling	recommending	the	same	distinction.	Finally,	I	have	argued	that	the	tripartite	distinction	makes	full	sense	within	an	influential	current	account	of	modelling	practice.				 		REFERENCES		Bogen,	Jim	and	Woodward,	James.	1988.	Saving	the	Phenomena.	The	Philosophical	
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